Who really rules the Czech Republic?

We can perceive the situation around us according to pre-made judgments. Today it is modernly called "living in your social bubble". We prioritize what seems right and logical to us over what does not fit into the framework of our feelings, opinions and prejudices. The information offered to us by the media, politicians or social networks simply confirms what we already "know well".

Or we can choose a different approach - to assess our surroundings case by case, to critically analyze them, to doubt everything that seems obvious. In that case, we form our opinions according to the results of our own critical analysis.

Such an approach reveals sometimes unexpected connections and can point to common denominators and causes of the problems we face.

Are you asking how it is possible that a meeting of the Sudetenland Landsmanschaft took place in Brno? An organization at whose birth the Nazis stood? And why do none of the official representatives of the Czech Republic protest when our allies award state honors to extremists who participated in ethnic cleansing?

A few years ago we would have taken certain things for granted. It was unacceptable in any way to support a state that would add a criminal like the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Andriy Melnyk to its pantheon of national heroes. It was impossible for the Czech constitutional authorities to provide protection for the political provocation of an association that attacks the foundations of our country's legal system, seeks to change the post-war arrangement and makes victims of the perpetrators of wartime suffering.

Today, the media forces us to question whether a nation defending itself against Russian aggression does not have the right to glorify extremists after all. Whether the entry of the Red Army into Czechoslovakia in 1945 was liberation or occupation and Russia is no greater risk to our national security than the rehabilitation of Nazism or ex-Nazis.

How is that possible? Does the power group formed by the opposition parties, President Pavlo, part of the Czech business elites and the media really have such an influence on public opinion? Or is the root of the problem in the lack of resistance and passivity of those who look at the matter differently? Now let's leave aside the Czech politicians, whose actions have already crossed the line between incompetence and collaboration. The photo of Peter Pavel with the satisfied head of the Bavarian government at Prague Castle - on the same day he attended the Sudetenland Congress - will go down in history as a symbol of lackeys.

But where is the prime minister who fit the role of foreign policy coordinator? Why is he unable to effectively intervene against Pavlov with Vystrčil? Where is the Minister of the Interior, unable to find the slightest obstacle to the Sudetenland meeting? Where is the foreign minister to protest to the Kiev government against the rehabilitation of Nazis and their collaborators? We pay the government to protect our interests, safety and dignity. Why was she not even able to condemn and defend the monument of President Edvard Beneš, whose statue was desecrated by extremists in Brno on the eve of the Sudetenland meeting?

Or another story. A reorganization is underway at the Government Office. A seemingly trivial case of transferring selected agendas to ministries swelled into a media cause. Under normal circumstances, the prime minister would fire the head of the office who failed to prepare, including communication within the departments and expert groups, and did not pass the media appearances. But instead, the prime minister backs down. It does not show authority, but weakness.

And the last example, which could be summed up in one sentence: Koudelka has frayed himself. As if the government had not changed at all and the weak Fiala was still in office. Opposition MP and controversial figure Pavel Žáček from the ODS once again held a security conference in the Chamber of Deputies. And Michal Koudelka performed on it again, who was echoed by Karel Řehka. Did these functionaries subordinate to the government present the position of the cabinet there? Not at all. As in the past, Žaček's conference served primarily for the personal presentation of the participants, united by hatred for Russia and love for Ukraine. The director of the BIS again warned against Russia's attempt to divide the West, while Chief of the General Staff Karel Řehka pointed out that the Czech Republic needs to act faster. Both emphasized that supporting Ukraine is not a charity, but a strategic interest of the country. Do you also believe that members of the government, and not their subordinates, should speak and make policy on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies? However, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense would have to intervene. THEY SHOULD RULE.

There is a fundamental difference between formal function and real power, constitutional authority and actual control. A representative of the state may have the legal authority given by the office, but may not have the actual ability to enforce his will. A minister may have high office but minimal actual influence. Conversely, a party strategist, an oligarch, a media magnate or a representative of the security forces can rule without a position. Likewise, a parliamentary majority, if it does not use power effectively, may represent a formal mechanism while the real power lies elsewhere. Whether in the apparatus of political parties, economic networks, bureaucracy, the army and intelligence services or the media.

(Robert Michels, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy": every organization eventually becomes oligarchical. Even a democratic party or state, according to him, is practically controlled by a narrow group of professional functionaries.)

That should worry us. We don't expect the government to meddle in our daily lives, but in times of crisis or when we face danger, it should use executive powers to intervene. It is not he who holds office according to procedure who really rules, but he who can decide in a crisis. In crises, the importance of security structures increases and, according to some, normal constitutional mechanisms give way to the logic of "necessity". A politician who fears a coup, war, terrorism or state collapse often hands over de facto power to those with operational capacity.

Here there is a sharp difference between ordinary administrative function and real sovereignty. In modern political science, a distinction is made between: "office-holding" — holding an office, and "governing capacity" — the ability to actually govern. Thus, a weak prime minister can formally head the government in a coalition system, but the real power veto can be held by coalition partners, the courts, the security apparatus, the central bank, EU institutions, or financial markets. Not everyone who is in government automatically rules.

Elections are determined by system administrators, not necessarily its real masters.

What is the fundamental factor influencing government behavior? In addition to the objective abilities of each of its members, it is fear. It is a much more significant element than coercion. It is precisely as a result of fear that the formal holders of power most often become dependent on the apparatus they are supposed to control. Already N. Machiavelli distinguished between a ruler who controls fear and a ruler who is controlled by fear. A ruler who becomes afraid of the army, the court, popular uprisings, conspiracies or his own guards loses his autonomy and becomes a figure dependent on those who control information and coercion.

A paradox emerges: the state monopolizes protection against fear, and at the same time monopolizes the means of inducing fear. Whoever controls the security apparatus can gradually control the head of state or the government. Even a politician who is not controlled by his fear faces the reality of what Alexis de Tocqueville calls the "soft despotism" of administration, when not an outright tyrant rules, but a network of official structures that the politician gradually loses control of. A politician dependent on the expertise, information and procedures of the bureaucracy can formally make decisions, but practically only confirms the decisions of the apparatus.

Michel Foucault analyzed the "microphysics of power", where power does not reside only in top positions, but in networks of experts, institutions, surveillance and discipline. The politician may be the public face of the system, while the actual governance takes place through administrative norms, security procedures, information classification or expert regimes. Permanent structures of the state have continuity, information and coercive means that exceed the capabilities of temporary elected politicians. From ancient history, we know the situation of late Roman emperors dependent on praetorians or Ottoman sultans on janissaries. From modern history, for example, American presidents were fundamentally influenced by the security apparatus during the Cold War. And a mirror late Soviet leadership dependent on the party bureaucracy and the KGB. Currently, this process is usually more subtle, but no less effective. As we know from many cases in the Czech Republic from recent years, real government is exercised through intelligence information, control of expertise or procedural complexities, media pressure or permanent invocation of crises. The more politicians fear destabilization, the more they strengthen the apparatus, which gradually makes it expendable.

Let's go back to Machiavelli for a moment. He understands fear much more delicately than it is often reduced to the famous question "is it better to be loved or feared". In fact, he distinguishes several types of fear and several directions of its action. The key is that the ruler must be able to work with the fear of others, but not become a prisoner of his own fear. In the file The Ruler states: it is safer to be feared than loved if one cannot be both. Love is unstable, fear is a more predictable political mechanism. However, the ruler must not be hated. This is a major limitation. Fear must be controlled, legally or symbolically justified and limited. Unchecked terror leads to conspiracies and disintegration of loyalties. A lesser known but more profound part of Machiavelli's analysis concerns the psychology of the ruler himself. According to him, a ruler often degenerates through the following almost natural process: he gains power - he becomes afraid of losing it - he isolates himself - he stops trusting those around him - he leans on a narrow circle of protectors - he becomes dependent on those who "protect" him. Instead of a ruler, add the Czech prime minister and look through Machiavelli's eyes at the activity or rather the inactivity of the government under his leadership - in cases when it is unable to face extremism, keep its subordinates in check or just push through administrative reforms.

Machiavelli repeatedly warns: rulers hear only what their subjects allow them to hear. The mere fear of bad news leads to the suppression of open communication and self-censorship while the power of courtiers, secretaries and military commanders grows in parallel. The ruler formally makes decisions, but his image of reality is produced by the apparatus. Machiavelli was almost obsessed with the question, who holds the guns? It was important for him that the monarch was not dependent on mercenaries, foreign military forces, or autonomous armed structures. Because whoever controls the ruler's protection can ultimately control the ruler himself.

Machiavelli's significant and very contemporary observation concerns the relationship between fear and the threat to citizens' liberties. A weak ruler is often more repressive than a strong one. In other words: a weak and inefficient government resorts to bans, orders and general restrictions on citizens. Why? Because, according to Machiavelli, a confident ruler uses power selectively. A frightened ruler, on the other hand, reacts chaotically, delegating violence and relying on secret police, guards or court cliques. The result is the growth of the autonomy of the repressive elements and the decline of the real authority of the monarch. This was repeated in many modes. From late imperial Rome, through Renaissance courts, tsarist Russia and the late authoritarian regimes of the 20th century, to the Czech Republic of Fiala and Babiš. With this view, Michal Koudelka and Karel Řehka show themselves as what they really are. Instead of strong generals, we see the product of the fear of weak governments. Although they have democratic legitimacy, they do not strive for detailed information capacity. The security apparatus holds know-how, intelligence, institutional memory, contacts with allies and operational infrastructure. An asymmetry arises when a minister or prime minister is formally superior, but practically dependent. The public statements of the head of the intelligence service or the general staff of the army can then set the framework of the debate, define the "security reality" and define the boundaries of legitimate political decision-making. Not by command, but through a monopoly on the interpretation of reality.

Whoever determines what constitutes a threat and a security risk gains extraordinary political influence. If the security institutions themselves publicly define the threats, interpret the geopolitical situation and morally frame the conflict, then they are no longer purely technical tools of the government. They become co-creators of political reality. It is a state on the verge of constitutionality. Neutral executive actors become autonomous players, with their own agenda and interests.

Koudelka's example shows how much power is gained by the one who decides what is "disinformation", what is a "hybrid threat" or "threat to democracy". It creates a norm, delegitimizes alternative interpretations and puts public space in check. A security player becomes a manager of public space - a politician and an alternative source of government.

Then the question remains: Does the prime minister need a security apparatus for his own stability, or does the apparatus need the prime minister? If a politician does not want to bear full responsibility, is afraid of a security failure and relies on expert authority for legitimacy, then the autonomy of these structures naturally grows. Armed or intelligence structures themselves will begin to enter into the formation of political reality. Not necessarily because they want to take over, but because every institution tends to expand into the space cleared by civilian leadership.

This is countered by the classic argument that in the current permanent security crisis it is legitimate for security representatives to publicly communicate risks. It is said that society needs an expert voice and politicians are unable to interpret complex threats by themselves. It sounds nice: transparency is better than behind-the-scenes and it is about professionalizing public debate.

However, where does professional information end and the political co-creation of public space begin?

Answer: this border should be strictly determined and ruthlessly guarded by the government. When government fails to act, anarchy ensues. The autonomy of the security apparatus may grow not primarily from its ambitions or qualities, but from the weakness of civilian politics. From the weakness of the government.

Finally, let's return to N. Machiavelli. In addition to sharp analysis, it also offers a starting point that is as current as it was 500 years ago. He is virtù. It does not mean moral virtue. Rather, the ability to act, courage and strategic decisiveness. The opposite is not "vice" but passivity and fear. A ruler, in our case a prime minister or a minister, loses power not when he is formally deposed, but when he ceases to actively shape the situation, becomes reactive and fearful.

Let's remind the government that power is not holding office. Power is to rule - to act without being paralyzed by fear. And a courageous politician is not someone obsessed with social media output or the loudest person in the room. You will recognize him when he prevents the Sudeten Congress, confronts the falsification of history, collaborators or the rehabilitation of the Nazis. When they fire disloyal generals and incompetent officials. And when once in a while he makes an unpopular but necessary decision.