Constitution on its knees? The President and the Constitutional Court set a dangerous precedent

The decision of the Constitutional Court in the competence dispute between the president of the republic and the government undoubtedly belongs to the most significant constitutional law events of the last decades. The public debate focused primarily on the question of who should represent the Czech Republic at the NATO summit. However, the real problem is much deeper. It is not just a dispute between the president and the government. It is a question of whether Czech constitutional law is beginning to change through judicial interpretation instead of a democratic legislative process.

The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy. The President of the Republic is the head of state, not the bearer of general executive power. Foreign policy is the responsibility of the government, which is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. The Constitution does not explicitly state anywhere that it is the president who must represent the state at NATO summits. Current practice has been the result of political agreement and constitutional custom, not express statutory mandate.

It is precisely for this reason that it is legitimate to ask whether the whole dispute does not arise from an extremely extensive interpretation of the presidential position. A constitutional custom in itself is not the same as a legal claim. If it begins to be understood as an immediately judicially enforceable authorization, a fundamental shift in the understanding of the Czech constitutional system takes place.

However, no less serious questions are raised by the procedure of the Constitutional Court itself.

The court ruled extremely quickly. While ordinary citizens wait for a decision on their constitutional complaints for months and often more than a year, he intervened in this matter almost immediately. Such speed is exceptional in his decision-making practice.

This in itself may not constitute misconduct. Urgent matters may require urgent decisions.

Nevertheless, a question arises that cannot be overlooked.

Why was extremely quick protection found just for the highest constitutional official, while thousands of citizens have been waiting months for their basic rights to be protected? How many parents have lost contact with their children while waiting? How many people lost property, employment or the possibility of effective legal protection? How many constitutional complaints have been dismissed without a hearing on the merits, even though their consequences were irreversible for specific people?

The rule of law is not only about the quality of decisions. Equally important is public confidence that judicial protection is not apportioned according to the importance of the person seeking it.

Another question is raised by the legal basis of the decision itself.

The Act on the Constitutional Court does not explicitly regulate the issuance of a preliminary measure in jurisdictional disputes. The Constitutional Court therefore chose an analogous interpretation of procedural rules. It was this procedure that was the subject of expert controversy, and two constitutional judges attached different opinions to it.

This does not mean that the decision is automatically illegal. However, it means that it is a procedure that significantly expands the current procedural practice and will undoubtedly be the subject of a long-term professional discussion.

The biggest concern therefore does not lie in one NATO summit.

It rests in precedent.

If the court begins to provide immediate judicial protection to rights derived primarily from constitutional customs and at the same time uses a procedural tool that the law does not explicitly regulate for a given type of procedure, it is legitimate to ask whether there is a shift in the boundary between the interpretation of the law and its actual completion.

Constitutional customs are undoubtedly an important part of the functioning of any parliamentary democracy. Traditionally, however, they arise through long-term political practice and mutual respect of constitutional institutions. They are not written law in themselves. If their bindingness begins to be extended through the courts, this is a significant change to the constitutional system, which deserves an extremely careful professional debate.

It is here that the most serious constitutional question of the whole case opens up.

Should the scope of constitutional powers be created primarily by democratically adopted constitutional norms and laws, or gradually completed by case law in individual disputes?

This is not an attack on the Constitutional Court. This is a question of the very nature of the separation of powers.

The Constitutional Court is the protector of the Constitution, not the legislator. Parliament is the only body to which the Constitution entrusts the adoption of laws. If court decisions begin to have a practical effect consisting in the creation of a new generally significant rule for the functioning of constitutional institutions, it is appropriate to conduct an open professional discussion on whether we are not approaching the threshold beyond which the interpretation of law changes into its completion.

The signal sent to the public is equally worrying.

A citizen can legitimately ask why his constitutional complaint is waiting for months, while the dispute between the highest constitutional representatives is resolved in a matter of hours. Trust in the rule of law is not only created by the correctness of the decision. It also arises from the belief that the same principles apply to everyone.

If the impression is created that there is one speed of constitutional justice for the highest representatives of the state and another for ordinary citizens, the authority of the entire judiciary will suffer, regardless of how correct the particular decision was.

This case is therefore not only a dispute about the president or the government. It is a test of the Czech constitutional system.

If citizens' confidence in the democratic rule of law is to be maintained, any extension of constitutional principles must be exceptionally convincingly justified. Otherwise, there will be a dangerous feeling that the rules are not changed by Parliament, but are gradually created by court decisions.

And that is exactly what a democratic rule of law should avoid. The strength of the Constitution does not lie in the fact that it can be flexibly adapted to current political disputes. Its strength lies in its stability, predictability and the fact that the same rules apply to the president of the republic as to every ordinary citizen.

Source

1. CZECH REPUBLIC. 1993.Constitution of the Czech Republic(Constitutional Act No. 1/1993 Coll., as amended by later constitutional acts). Prague: Parliament of the Czech Republic.

2. CZECH REPUBLIC. 1993.Act No. 182/1993 Coll., on the Constitutional Court, as amended. Prague: Parliament of the Czech Republic.

3. JAREŠ, A. 2026.A constitutional coup, claims Macinka. "It is not appropriate, such strong words must be rejected," says lawyer Preuss. iROZHLAS, 24 June 2026. Available from:iROZHLAS

4. CZECH TELEVISION. 2026.The ÚS imposed a preliminary measure on the government to ensure the participation of the president in the NATO summit. ČT24, 24 June 2026. Available from:CT24

5. PREUSS, O. 2026.The president's lawsuit is well written. A preliminary measure is a bold request. Czech Justice, 24 June 2026. Available from:Czech justice