A complaint against the judge? In the Czech justice system, you often encounter a wall of silence and alibis

The independence of the judiciary is one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic legal state. Without it, the courts would not be able to protect citizens from the arbitrariness of politicians, officials or powerful interest groups. This is precisely why the independence of the judge is constitutionally protected and represents one of the most important guarantees of a fair trial. But every democratic value can be deformed if it begins to be interpreted without reasonable limits. In the Czech environment, it increasingly seems that judicial independence is becoming a modern-day charm that can be used to ward off almost any criticism of the court's procedure.

At the same time, independence should never have meant irresponsibility. It was not supposed to create the impression of factual impunity of the judge or exclude the possibility of reviewing procedural errors. Its purpose is to protect judges from external pressures when deciding disputes. However, the moment this principle starts to be used as a universal answer to every complaint about the functioning of the court, it becomes dangerously distorted.

At the same time, the Czech legal system contains a mechanism that is supposed to prevent just such situations. Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts and Judges, allows you to file a complaint about delays in proceedings, inappropriate behavior of judicial persons or violation of the dignity of judicial proceedings. The authorities of the state administration of the courts are obliged to investigate such a complaint. The word "investigate" is key. Not just to deal with it formally, but to really find out the facts, verify the claims contained in the complaint, obtain the necessary documents and properly justify your conclusions.

However, practice often creates a completely different impression.

A citizen submits a detailed, documented complaint. Attaches a timeline of events, documentary evidence, data reports, draws attention to specific procedural errors, delays or inaction. He expects someone to actually verify his claims. Instead, it often receives several paragraphs, the main message of which is that the president of the court cannot interfere with the independent decision-making activity of the judge.

But this is where a fundamental problem arises.

In most of these cases, it is not a review of a court decision at all. No one is asking for a change in the verdict, a new evaluation of the evidence, or an order for the judge to make a decision. The subject of the complaint is usually delays, inaction, failure to process procedural submissions, administrative errors or the way the court office functions. These are issues of the state administration of the courts, not independent decision-making.

Yet the responses often follow the same pattern. Independence of the judge. Impossibility to interfere in decision-making. Incompetence of the president of the court. And the matter is closed.

It is here that it becomes clear that the constitutional principle becomes a universal defense argument. Independence, which was supposed to protect fair decision-making, turns into a symbol of factual irresponsibility and difficult enforcement of liability for procedural misconduct in the eyes of the public.

This problem is illustrated by the procedure of the District Court in Nymburk and the subsequent review by the Regional Court in Prague. Although questions were raised regarding the processing of procedural submissions, delays and the manner of performing the state administration of the court, a substantial part of the argumentation was rejected with reference to the impossibility of interfering with the decision-making activity of the judge. However, such an approach leaves open the basic question: who will actually review whether the state administration of the courts have fulfilled their legal obligation to properly investigate the complaint?

Even more serious is the design of the control mechanism itself. The president of the district court assesses the complaint about the functioning of the court. The chairman or deputy chairman of the regional court subsequently reviews the manner in which the chairman of the district court handled the complaint. The entire process takes place within one court system. There is no truly independent control body outside this structure.

It is therefore not surprising that the public may get the impression that the system works according to an old Czech saying"me on brother, brother on me".However, the problem is systemic. The controller and the controlled are part of the same institution, the same professional culture and the same organizational environment. Such a model naturally raises questions as to whether control can be truly impartial.

The quality of the justification is all the more important. If a public authority only announces that the complaint was handled objectively and that it found no wrongdoing, without explaining what facts it verified, what basis it was based on, and why it rejected individual objections, it does not increase public confidence. On the contrary, it weakens it. Transparency does not arise from the authority of the function, but from the persuasiveness of the arguments.

It is paradoxical that the judiciary, which demands proper justification of their decisions from other public authorities, sometimes itself uses arguments so general when handling complaints that it practically makes it impossible to verify the correctness of its conclusions.

But the biggest risk lies elsewhere. If the principle of judicial independence becomes a universal answer to every criticism of the functioning of the court, the public will cease to distinguish between independence and irresponsibility. In the eyes of the citizens, the belief will begin to form that the judge can make decisions independently, but virtually no one will effectively examine his procedural errors. And it is here that the biggest crack in trust in the rule of law arises.

Public trust is not based on the belief that judges are infallible. Such an idea is unrealistic. Trust is created by the certainty that if misconduct occurs, there is a truly independent, objective and effective mechanism to review it. A mechanism that is not pre-loaded with an effort to defend its own institution, but whose only goal is to find out the truth.

The rule of law is not based on the infallibility of courts. It is based on their responsibility. The independence of the judiciary must therefore not be confused with inviolability. If it becomes an incantation to dismiss almost any complaint, it ceases to protect justice and begins to protect the system from criticism. And this is a path that not only weakens citizens' trust in individual courts, but also the authority of the entire judiciary. A truly strong judiciary is not recognized by the fact that it rejects criticism. She knows herself by the fact that she is able to examine it honestly, admit her own mistake and correct it. Only such a judiciary is not only independent, but also trustworthy.

Source:

Czech Republic. (2002).Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on courts and judges.Collection of laws of the Czech Republic. Available from:https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2002-6

Czech Republic. (1993).Resolution of the Presidium of the Czech National Council No. 2/1993 Coll., which promulgates the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.Collection of laws of the Czech Republic. Available from:https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/1993-2

European Court of Human Rights. (1994).Ruiz Torija v. Spain, Application No. 18390/91, Judgment of 9 December 1994. Available from:HUDOC – Ruiz Torija v. Spain

European Court of Human Rights. (1994).Hiro Balani v. spain, Application No. 18064/91, Judgment of 9 December 1994. Available from:HUDOC – Hiro Balani v. Spain

Council of Europe. (2024).European judicial systems – CEPEJ Evaluation Report.Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Available from:CEPEJ – European judicial systems reports