Judge Fukal again on the edge of the law? Nymburk justice system under fire

Stories about the weakening of the rule of law do not always begin with a coup, political pressure or outright violation of the constitution. Sometimes they start out much more ordinary. One missing statement. One protocol that doesn't match what another court document says happened during the hearing. One participant who is ordered to be heard by the court, but before he gets a real chance to speak, he already hears the verdict. And then another error comes. And more. And it gradually ceases to be important whether each of them can be explained individually. It becomes important what their sum does to trust in the institution that is supposed to be the last guarantor of legality.

This is exactly how the proceedings conducted at the District Court in Nymburk under sp. stamp 8 C 87/2025 by judge Mgr. Jakub Fukal. Over time, an initially ordinary dispute over the settlement of the spouses' common property has turned into a textbook question of the procedural culture of justice.

In January 2026, the court issued a judgment. Later it turned out that his opinion part did not decide on the entire subject of the proceedings at all. It wasn't a typo in the birth number or a misspelled date. Decisions on several claims were missing. The court itself subsequently admitted that it had not been formally decided on the whole matter. However, the defect was not caught before the file was submitted to the Court of Appeal. It was only in June that the Regional Court in Prague returned the file "without substantive resolution", as the entire subject matter of the proceedings had not been decided.

A mistake can happen. This also applies to judges. But just after such a finding, one would expect an almost laboratory-clean next procedure. The court already knows that his original judgment was incomplete. He knows the matter is on appeal. He knows that the participant does not agree to the decision without negotiation. And so he really orders the meeting.

But on August 14, another turning point comes.

The official record records the persons present, the announcement that the hearing is being recorded, and then follows a sentence that should have stunned any litigator in a state of law: "Therefore, without adjournment, this JUDGMENT was pronounced." This is immediately followed by four negative statements. Before the announcement of the judgment, the protocol does not record any presentation by the defendant, no call for statements, no discussion of individual claims or closing arguments.

So what was the purpose of the meeting?

The Code of Civil Procedure does not establish a hearing as a theatrical backdrop to add a more solemn atmosphere to an already completed verdict. Its purpose is to give the participants the opportunity to argue, object, react and convince the court even before it decides. The Constitutional Court in the decision II. ÚS 3679/12 emphasized that if the participant did not waive the right to participate and did not agree to the decision without negotiations, the meaning of his procedural right cannot be circumvented. The participant should have the opportunity to appear before the court, present claims, evidence and defend his rights. In the ruling I. ÚS 1555/23, the Constitutional Court explained even more precisely that the right to be heard means having the opportunity to effectively argue the issues on which the decision will be based, i.e. to actually influence the judicial reasoning.

The right to speak after the verdict has already been pronounced is similar to the right to comment on the train after it has left the station. According to § 156, paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court is bound by the pronounced judgment. Therefore, if the participant gets a real space only after the court announces the decision, one can legitimately ask whether he was really heard or only heard.

And then comes another oddity. The supplementary judgment itself expressly states that an objection of bias was raised at the hearing on 14 August. However, the protocol on the same meeting does not capture it at all. So we have two documents from the same court: one asserts that the procedural act existed, the other is silent about it.

Even more strange is the conclusion of the protocol. He first states that the defendant's proposal to supplement it was rejected. A few lines further on, however, follows the formulation "Aloud dictated without objection." How can the protocol be unobjectionable when it itself registers a dispute about its content?

The Supreme Administrative Court already dealt with a similar situation in disciplinary decision 11 Kss 5/2023-156. There, it turned out that the protocol marked as dictated "without objection" did not correspond to the audio recording, according to which the objections were actually made. The Disciplinary Board emphasized that faithful recording is not a cosmetic formality. It is a condition for the participant to be able to effectively defend their rights and for it to be possible to find out what happened in the negotiation room later.

And this is where we come to another, somewhat bizarre Nymburk tradition: making a decision at a time when the question of bias still hangs around the deciding judge. It almost starts to look like a kind of procedural pastime of the Nymburk court — first decide and then explain what exactly with the objection of bias.

Legally, of course, it is necessary to be precise. Each objection of bias does not automatically stop the proceedings, and § 15b paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows, under certain conditions, not to submit the case to a superior court. But that is not the essence of the problem. The order is important. If the participant is given a real opportunity to raise doubts about the judge's impartiality only after the same judge has just announced the verdict, then procedural law begins to resemble a fire alarm that is activated only after the house burns down.

In a rule of law, the question of judicial impartiality should not be a technical note behind a judgment. It is one of the prerequisites for the very legitimacy of decision-making. And if the court process creates the image that a decision is first made and only then is it decided whether the participant even had the opportunity to raise a relevant doubt, such a procedure can perhaps be procedurally explained, but it is extremely unfortunate for public trust.

Another curiosity fits into this picture. The supplementary judgment is dated August 11, 2026. But the same document evaluates the objection of bias, which it itself claims was raised only on August 14. Of course, a wrong date alone is not evidence of a pre-arranged decision. It could have been a simple clerical error. But when we already have an incomplete original judgment, a returned file, a meeting without a recorded hearing of the matter, an uncaught objection of bias and an internally contradictory protocol, another "banal error" ceases to seem so banal.

It is here that the story of one judge becomes the story of the entire system.

The judicial power can take a citizen's property, intervene in family relationships, decide on his freedom and definitively determine his rights and obligations. Such power can only be democratically legitimized if it is itself strictly bound by rules. The authority of the court is not created by the coat of arms above the judge's desk. It arises from the conviction that the court respects the same right that the citizen demands respect for.

And this is where the real problem begins. A citizen misses the deadline and bears the consequences. It does not mark the evidence in time and bears the consequence. It formulates the proposal inaccurately and bears the consequences. But when a court omits part of a statement, captures a meeting inaccurately, or produces a document with an impossible chronology, it is often explained away as a mistake that will be "corrected."

Such asymmetry is poisonous to trust in the rule of law.

It does not mean that every judicial error is a disciplinary offence. But if procedural defects are layered, returned and confirmed in the documents of the court itself, then the public has the right to demand more than another phrase about the possibility of filing an appeal.

An appeal can correct the judgment. It cannot retroactively create trust in a process that has already taken place.

Therefore, the Law on Courts and Judges expressly requires the judge to behave in such a way as not to undermine confidence in the judiciary and to give every participant a full opportunity to exercise his rights. It is not a moral recommendation. It is a legal obligation.

And that's why Judge Fukal's case is bigger than a property dispute.

The key question today is not whether the Regional Court will confirm or cancel the individual statements. It sounds different: how many procedural contradictions can arise with one judge and in one case, before their sum begins to objectively undermine trust in the proper administration of justice?

The rule of law does not end when the court issues an erroneous judgment. It can be fixed.

The real danger comes only when the citizen begins to believe that procedural rules are strictly binding for him, while for the court they are only recommendations.

And then it is no longer a dispute between one participant and judge Jakub Fukal.

Then it is a dispute of justice with its own credibility.

The rule of law does not begin with the citizen respecting the judgment. It starts with the court and the judge respecting the law.

Resources.

1. Act No. 99/1963 Coll., Code of Civil Procedure, especially § 115, § 115a, § 119a and § 156.e-Collection. Available from:e-Collection - Civil Procedure Code

2. Act No. 6/2002 Coll., on Courts, Judges, Magistrates and State Administration of Courts and on Amendments to Certain Other Acts (Act on Courts and Judges), in particular Section 79 and Section 80.Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. Available from:Act No. 6/2002 Coll.

3. Constitutional Court, 2013. Finding of 16 April 2013, file no. stamp II. ÚS 3679/12, N 57/69 SbNU 109,Regarding the court's obligation to order proceedings on the merits. Brno: Constitutional Court. Available from:NALUS – II. ÚS 3679/12.

4. Constitutional Court, 2023. Finding of 19 September 2023, file no. stamp I. ÚS 1555/23, N 135/120 SbNU 69,The right of a party to the proceedings to comment on a different legal opinion of the Court of Appeal. Brno: Constitutional Court. Available from:NALUS – I. ÚS 1555/23

5. Supreme Administrative Court, 2024. Decision of the Disciplinary Board of 17 April 2024, No. 11 Kss 5/2023-156. Brno: Supreme Administrative Court. Available from:NSS search engine – 11 Kss 5/2023-156