Ombudsman without power? An expensive institution that stops protecting rights

The public defender of rights should have been one of the key safeguards of a democratic rule of law. An institution that stands between the citizen and power, that corrects the excesses of the authorities, that balances the formalism of state administration and protects the individual where standard mechanisms fail. But it is here that an unpleasant question arises: what if this insurance stops working?

Act No. 349/1999 Coll. gives the ombudsman a clear role – to protect individuals from actions by authorities that are contrary to the law or the principles of good administration. And it expressly says that its jurisdiction does not extend to the courts, but with an important exception: the state administration of the courts. In other words, where the judiciary administers, not decides, the ombudsman is supposed to control. This is not a marginal competence. This is the very core of its function.

However, it is here that a systematic problem begins to emerge. If the initiative, which is directed against the performance of the state administration of the courts, is rejected with a reference to the "decision-making activity of the court", it is not a legal opinion. It's about pushing the boundaries of the law. On extending the exclusion beyond its text. About the actual emptying of competence.

Even more serious is the situation when this procedure is accompanied by formalism. The petitions are rejected for allegedly not meeting the conditions, even though they have been documented. The argument rests on procedural constructions unknown to the law. And instead of a substantive review comes the message that "it can't be helped." This wording isn't just a turn of phrase — it's a symptom. A symptom of an institution that resigns from its own role.

At the same time, the law establishes a clear procedure: either postpone the initiative (Section 12), or start an investigation (Section 14), or call for additions (Section 11). In between, there is no room for indefinite intermediate states. However, if the institution creates just such intermediate states, the problem of reviewability arises. And with it comes responsibility.

Even more serious is the impact on fundamental rights themselves. If the judicial authorities fail to fulfill their duty under Section 172 of the Courts and Judges Act – to actually investigate the complaint – and if the Section 173 notification lacks concrete findings, the whole mechanism becomes illusory. And if the ombudsman does not correct this situation, then the illusion turns into a system.

The right to a fair trial under Articles 36 and 38 of the Charter is not just a declaration. It also includes the right to comment on the evidence, to be heard, to be an equal participant in the proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights in Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands clearly articulated the principle of equality of arms: no party must be disadvantaged in the proceedings. However, if the participant does not have the opportunity to respond to the documents, and at the same time there is no effective remedy mechanism, then this is not a minor procedural defect. It is an attack on the very essence of due process.

And here we come to the crux of the problem: if the complaint mechanism within the judiciary does not work, and at the same time the institution that is supposed to control this area also fails, where does the individual seek protection? Constitutional court? European Court of Human Rights? These are the last instances. The Ombudsman should have been the first filter. The one who catches the problem before it escalates.

At the same time, the economic dimension cannot be overlooked either. The Office of the Public Defender of Rights is a separate chapter of the state budget. For the year 2026, its expenses amount to approximately 220 million crowns per year. This is not a token amount. This is a public investment in the protection of rights. And every such investment must be measured by the result.

So the question is not whether an ombudsman exists. The question is: does it fulfill its function.

If the institution:

refuses to objectively review the initiatives falling within its competence,

replaces legal argumentation with formalism,

and resigns to the protection of fundamental rights where it is most needed,

then it is not individual misconduct. This is a structural problem.

And structural problems have one unpleasant feature: they are not immediately visible. They appear gradually. Erosion of trust. I feel powerless. And finally, they lose faith that the law can be an effective tool of protection.

So perhaps the most fundamental question is: Does an institution that fails to effectively protect rights still have a rationale? And if so, under what conditions?

Because the state cannot afford the luxury of institutions that exist only formally.
And the citizen cannot afford the luxury of rights protection that exists only on paper.

Source:

1. Chamráthová, A. (2019) Rules applicable to the activity of the public defender of rights and criteria applicable to the use of his discretion. Journal of Legal Science and Practice, 27(1), pp. 65-83.

2. Doubek, P. (2023) Ombudsman as a national human rights institution. Journal of Legal Science and Practice, 31(2), pp. 353-379.

3. Chamráthová, A. (2017) Enshrining the public defender of rights in the Constitution of the Czech Republic. Legal perspectives.

4. Sládeček, V. (2011) Law on the Public Defender of Rights - Commentary. Prague: Faculty of Law, UK.

5. Koukal, P. (2008) The Ombudsman and Public Interest Litigation. State Attorney's Office.

6. Chamráthová, A.; Svoboda, T. (2018) Public defender of rights as a monocratic body. Jurisprudence, 4/2018, pp. 20–32. Available from:

7. Sládeček, V. (2017) Public defender of rights: current legal status. Prague: Charles University

8. Public Ombudsman (2026) Official information on the activities of the Ombudsman.