Child protector or authorities? Uncomfortable questions for the children's ombudsman

When the Czech Republic established the institution of a children's ombudsman after years of debate, the public was promised that an independent authority was being created that would stand on the side of the child where the state failed. She was supposed to be the voice of the most vulnerable. It was supposed to draw attention to the inactivity of authorities, violations of children's rights and systemic failures of public administration. It was supposed to be an institution that would not look for reasons not to act, but on the contrary would actively defend the best interest of the child. But the first significant cases raise an unpleasant question. Is the children's ombudsman really a protector of the child's rights, or does he become more of a protector of the public administration against criticism?

This question does not arise for political reasons or personal animosity. It follows from the content of his own statements. In a specific case, the children's ombudsman was not asked to change the school's decision or to review court judgments. He was not called upon to make decisions in place of courts or administrative bodies. He was asked for only one thing – to assess whether the almost one-year inactivity of administrative authorities in proceedings concerning minor children is compatible with the law, the principles of good governance, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and the jurisprudence of Czech and European courts. This is precisely the reason why this institution was established.

But the answer does not practically solve this question.

Instead of an analysis of the long-term inactivity of administrative bodies, the reader will learn general lessons about parental responsibility, the powers of school principals, the possibilities of contacting the Czech School Inspection or the court. In other words, a problem that no one objected to is solved, while the problem that was at the heart of the motion remains aside. How is it possible that the institution designed to protect the rights of the child is unable to answer the basic question of whether the almost year-long procedural inactivity of the administrative authorities is compatible with the child's right to effective protection?

Something else is even more disturbing. The children's ombudsman's response seems to carefully avoid all the legal issues that were crucial to the initiative. The Convention on the Rights of the Child is missing. The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms is missing. The most recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is missing. The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court is missing. Analysis of the inactivity of administrative bodies is missing. An assessment of the principles of good governance is missing. So what is actually left?

How can an institution whose mission is to protect the rights of the child write several pages of justification and not once cite the Convention on the Rights of the Child? At the same time, this convention forms the basis of the international protection of children and, according to Article 10 of the Constitution of the Czech Republic, it is part of the Czech legal system. Article 3 of the Convention unequivocally states that the best interest of the child must be the primary consideration in any activity of the administrative authorities. So why is it completely absent from the justification? Is it really possible to assess the rights of the child without mentioning the basic international treaty from which the protection of these rights is based?

Equally surprising is the silence regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Where is Article 32 protecting parenthood and the family? Where is Article 36 guaranteeing the right to effective legal protection? Where is Article 38 guaranteeing the hearing of the case without unnecessary delays? Should almost a year of inaction by administrative authorities remain outside of constitutional review just because the proceedings are being renewed? Isn't the length and course of this proceeding what should have been the subject of the investigation?

All the more embarrassing is the fact that the answer ignores the latest decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Novák v. Czech Republic case. It was in this judgment that the court openly criticized the Czech authorities for allowing the unilaterally created state of facts to gradually become the main argument for the final decision through their procedural passivity. The European Court clearly reminded that time is not a neutral factor in children's matters and that the state may not, by its inaction, legitimize a situation caused by the unilateral actions of one of the parents. How is it possible that the decision issued only shortly before the opinion of the children's ombudsman does not find a single mention in it? Isn't this jurisprudence crucial for similar cases?

The same question can be asked in relation to the Constitutional Court. He has been repeatedly emphasizing for many years that the unilateral relocation of a child or a change of school must not be rewarded by the public authority. He points out that the state must not, by its passivity, create a situation where an initially questionable or even illegal situation becomes practically irreversible due to the passage of time. Nevertheless, even this jurisprudence does not figure in the justification. Is it a coincidence or a conscious narrowing of the legal view of the problem?

Perhaps the most serious issue, however, remains the very inaction of administrative authorities. They themselves admitted the existence of new facts so significant that they allowed the reopening of the proceedings. In other words, they recognized that the original decision may be flawed. But then they stopped the proceedings and for many months practically nothing happens. Wasn't the children's ombudsman supposed to investigate whether the administrative authorities are complying with the principle of speed of proceedings, the principle of good administration and the best interest of the child? Instead, he contented himself with stating that the retrial was ongoing. But it was the course of this renewal that was the subject of the stimulus. Isn't this a logical contradiction?

If the children's ombudsman will not review the alleged inaction of administrative authorities in matters concerning minor children, who will? Should he wait until all proceedings have been legally concluded and the state of affairs has become irreversible? What is the point of protecting the child's rights, which only comes at a moment when he can no longer change anything?

In the same case, the schools, their founders, the Regional Office of the Ústí Region, the Czech School Inspectorate, the administrative courts and the institutions for the social and legal protection of children are appearing. Each solves only part of the problem. The children's ombudsman was supposed to be an institution that would look at the matter as a whole - from the point of view of the best interest of the child and the protection of his basic rights. Instead, he seems to have taken on the role of another link in the institutional chain, explaining why the matter should not be dealt with rather than examining whether the state has actually lived up to its obligations.

At the same time, it is not a question of a single case. It is a matter of public trust. If an institution created to protect children's rights ignores international conventions, constitutional principles, the current jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court and does not deal with the claimed almost one-year inaction of the administrative authorities, then it is legitimate to ask whether it fulfills the mission for which it was established.

The children's ombudsman is not supposed to be a lawyer for the authorities. He should not look for reasons to postpone the matter. It is supposed to be the last insurance against the child paying for the failure of the public administration. However, if even he does not open up the question of delays, inaction and the possible legitimization of a disputed state with the passage of time, who will? And if even the institution designated to protect the rights of the child cannot consistently use the tools given to it by Czech constitutional law, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the jurisprudence of European courts, then it is not just a problem of one decision. The question is whether the children's ombudsman institute does not become an institution that, instead of actively protecting the rights of the child, too often confirms that the state actually sees no problem. And it is to this question that the Czech public and the professional legal community should seek an answer.

Source:

1. Czech Republic. (1991).Communication of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 104/1991 Coll., on the Convention on the Rights of the Child.Prague: Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. Czech Republic. (1993).Resolution of the Presidium of the Czech National Council No. 2/1993 Coll., on the promulgation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as part of the constitutional order of the Czech Republic.Prague: Czech National Council.

3. Czech Republic. (1999).Act No. 349/1999 Coll., on the public defender of rights.Prague: Parliament of the Czech Republic.

4. Czech Republic. (2004).Act No. 500/2004 Coll., Administrative Code.Prague: Parliament of the Czech Republic.

5. European Court of Human Rights. (2026).Novak v. Czech Republic, Application No. 6656/24, Judgment of 9 April 2026. Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights.

6. Findings of the Constitutional Court stamps I. ÚS 955/15, I. ÚS 2570/21 and I. ÚS 3399/23,

7. Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court no. stamp 6 As 170/2025-37,

8. General Comment No. 14 (2013) of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child on Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.