When the court ignores the NSS: a case that challenges the rule of law

In the rule of law, there are moments that are not "just another decision", but a litmus test of the real functioning of justice. One of them is a situation where the regional court is unable – or unwilling – to respect its binding legal opinion after the nullifying judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court (NSS). Exactly such a moment represents the proceedings conducted at the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem under sp. stamp 16 A 22/2025, decided by resolution of 24 March 2026.

In the judgment of February 11, 2026, No. 6 As 170/2025-37, the NSS canceled the previous rejection of the claim and returned the case to the regional court with a clear legal framework. This was not vague guidance or academic reasoning. The NSS explicitly identified that the lawsuit contains a separate claim - failure to provide information to the legal representative about the education of minor children - and based this claim on Section 21(2) of the Education Act. At the same time, he confirmed that it is not a marginal procedural objection, but a question of the existence of a public subjective right.

The regional court therefore had only one procedurally correct solution: to consider this claim area substantively. Instead, however, he again dismissed the lawsuit. And in a way that raises serious doubts not only about the correctness of the decision, but about respect for the very foundations of judicial decision-making.

The key reason for rejection was the claim that the claimant had not remedied the filing defects. But it is here that the decision reaches a limit that cannot be excused even by a different legal opinion. It follows from the file that the lawsuit was supplemented - the factual circumstances were specified, the time of the intervention was defined, the evidence was marked and the petition was formulated. In other words: what the court called non-existent exists in the file.

This situation has major consequences. If the court bases its decision on a factual statement that does not correspond to the content of the file, it is no longer an interpretation of the law. It is a construct that is at odds with the reality of driving. And it is at this point that legal decision-making turns into something that can only be characterized as arbitrary.

Arbitrary is not a strong word used in affect. It is the precise legal term for a situation where a decision is not derived from law and fact, but from an unexamined, unexplained procedure. In the case under consideration, this sign is present on several levels. The court did not respect the binding legal opinion of the NSS according to § 110 paragraph 4 of the Administrative Code of Court. He did not settle a separate class of claims identified by the NSS. And at the same time, he based his decision on a claim that contradicts the record.

The result is a decision that is not only incorrect but unreviewable. The court does not explain why the supplement to the claim is insufficient, does not state what is specifically missing, and does not deal with the individual arguments of the plaintiff. Such a decision cannot be reviewed, cannot be rationally responded to, and cannot be defended in a system of judicial review. That is precisely why non-reviewability is considered one of the most serious grounds for cassation in the case law of the Supreme Court.

However, this opens up an even more fundamental level. This is not just a procedural error. The question of motive inevitably looms large in the background. Why did the court proceed in this way? Why did he not choose a meritorious hearing after the NSS intervened, but again looked for a way to avoid the matter?

There are several options. It may be a professional failure, when the judge Mgr. Václav Trajer from the Regional Court in Ústí nad Labem failed to interpret the binding legal opinion. It may be an attempt to administratively "close" the matter without substantive discussion. Or – and this is the most worrying option – it may be an institutional reflex to shield public administration decision-making from judicial review.

It cannot be overlooked that the lawsuit was directed, among other things, against a public entity at the regional level. If the court were to systematically reject such claims without a substantive hearing, it would be legitimate to suspect that this is not an isolated excess, but a wider problem. Justice then does not appear as an independent arbiter, but as a filter that does not allow certain types of disputes to be assessed on the merits at all.

This is a very fundamental moment for the rule of law. After all, judicial protection should not consist in the court deciding - in any way. It is supposed to consist of the court actually reviewing the case, sorting out the arguments and making a decision based on the law. If, instead, there is a repeated rejection of the claim contrary to the binding legal opinion of the NSS, judicial protection ceases to be realistic.

The case sp. stamp 16 A 22/2025 is not just an individual dispute about parental rights and access to education. It is a symptom of a deeper problem. It shows that even an annulment judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court may not automatically lead to a remedy. And this is an extremely dangerous signal for the functioning of justice.

If the court of lower instance does not respect the binding legal opinion of the higher court and bases its decision on an assertion that does not correspond to the file, then the system of judicial review reaches a state where it ceases to fulfill its basic function. It does not protect rights, it creates barriers.

And this is where public trust breaks down. Not on complex legal constructions, but on a simple question: does the law apply to the courts themselves? If the answer is "not always," then it's no longer an individual failure. Then it is a problem that affects the very foundations of the rule of law.

Source:

1.Supreme Administrative Court (2026).NSS judgment of February 11, 2026, No. 6 As 170/2025-37.

2.Parliament of the Czech Republic (2002).Act No. 150/2002 Coll., Administrative Code of Court. Available from:https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2002-150

3.Parliament of the Czech Republic (2004).Act No. 561/2004 Coll., Education Act. Available from:https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2004-561