Who guards the judge? The guardianship case reveals cracks in the Czech justice system

A bias objection is not a procedural trick or an obstruction. It is one of the most important institutions of the rule of law. Its meaning is simple – if there are objective doubts about the judge's impartiality, it must first be resolved whether he can decide on the matter. Only then should the proceedings continue. That is why the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates in § 15b that after the objection of bias has been applied, only actions can be taken that really cannot bear delay. The purpose of this amendment is not to protect the participant from an unfavorable decision, but to protect the public's confidence in the fact that human rights are decided by a truly impartial court. Without this trust, justice turns into mere administration.

But it is here that a different story is unfolding, which goes far beyond one custody dispute conducted at the District Court in Nymburk. This case does not raise the question of whether the court decided correctly or incorrectly. It raises a much more unpleasant question: does the appellate court still fulfill its role as an independent control body, or is it increasingly limited to finding reasons to confirm the procedure of the court of first instance, even if it itself admits its procedural errors?

The bias of the judge of the District Court in Nymburk, Mgr., was repeatedly objected to. Zuzana Kubů. At the same time, it was pointed out that even before the decision on this objection, the court continued to carry out important procedural acts. At the same time, it was not an administrative measure, but actions that could fundamentally influence the further course of guardianship proceedings, especially the question of questioning minor children even before the preparation of an expert opinion from the field of psychology, which was supposed to assess the possible influence or manipulation of children by one of the parents. In other words, the petitioner requested that the court first determine whether the children's statements were not influenced by manipulation before making them into evidence. Such a proposal is completely consistent, yet the court rejected it. However, it cannot simply be described as absurd or patently unreasonable.

The Regional Court in Prague subsequently entered the case. According to the author, his resolution of October 22, 2025 represents a textbook example of the internal contradiction of judicial decision-making. The Court of Appeal expressly stated that the district court did not proceed correctly when it rejected the proposal as incomprehensible or undefined. On the contrary, he stated that the proposal was definite and it was clear from it what the petitioner was demanding. At the same time, however, he left the result of the proceedings practically unchanged and only changed the procedural qualification from refusal to rejection. In other words – the regional court itself admitted the procedural error of the District Court in Nymburk, but removed its practical consequences by simply changing the wording of the judgment, without convincingly explaining why the detected error had no impact on the legality of the entire procedure.

Even more problematic, however, is the rationale relating to the objection of bias. The regional court stated that although the objection of bias was presented to the superior court, it was "necessary to decide on the motion, as the decision on the motion for a preliminary injunction cannot be delayed." But it was here that the Court of Appeals resigned itself to real review. He did not explain why in this particular case it was an action that could not be delayed. He did not say what specific harm would result if the court waited several days to rule on the bias objection. He made no balance between the right to a legal judge and the need for an immediate decision. Instead of a specific argument, he merely repeated the general legal formulation. Such a procedure may formally hold up, but in terms of the persuasiveness of the reasoning, it leaves fundamental questions unanswered.

It was this procedural situation that led to the filing of the lawsuit for confusion. Its purpose was not only to question the outcome of the proceedings. It should have opened the question of whether it is possible to approve and legalize decisions made at a time when the objection of bias has not yet been settled, and whether procedural defects that interfere with the very right to a legal judge can be overlooked. But here comes another paradox of the whole case. According to procedural rules, the claim for confusion was to be decided in the first instance by the District Court in Nymburk, i.e. the court whose previous procedural procedure was one of the main reasons for this claim. Subsequently, the same judge also ruled on the issue of the court fee for the lawsuit for confusion. Thus, a procedural situation arose which objectively raises doubts about the effectiveness of the review. Not because the law expressly prohibits such a procedure, but because an ordinary citizen can legitimately expect that the review of alleged procedural defects will be conducted in a manner that will not raise doubts about his impartiality.

The whole thing then ended in a way that symbolizes the growing formalism of Czech justice. The proceedings on the suit for confusion were stopped for non-payment of the court fee, and the Regional Court in Prague confirmed this procedure. No one disputes that court fees have their place in the legal system. Here, however, the fee ceased to be a tool for financing the judiciary and became a procedural obstacle that closed the way to a substantive review of fundamental procedural objections. Once there was talk of the right to a statutory judge, the implications of a pending bias objection, or the quality of the reasoning behind a previous decision, the entire debate shifted to the question of whether a court fee had been paid. Such a development does not inspire confidence that the courts really sought to answer the questions posed.

One might argue that this is an isolated case. But this is precisely the argument that is heard every time another similar case appears. One is about formalism, the second is about insufficient justification, the third is about unexaminedness, and the fourth is about ignoring substantial objections. Every single error can be explained. In their sum, however, they create a picture of a judiciary that is less and less willing to admit its own procedural error and increasingly relies on the fact that the complexity of procedural rules will deter most citizens from further defense.

Public confidence in the courts is not created by the court ruling. It arises because the citizen understands why the court decided in this way. If the court admits a procedural error by the first-instance court, but nevertheless practically preserves its result, if it approved the continuation of the proceedings without a more detailed argumentation despite the objection of bias, and if subsequently the substantive review ends at a procedural obstacle, it is not surprising that public trust weakens. Criticism is not the greatest enemy of justice. The biggest enemy of justice is the moment when citizens stop believing that the courts are willing to critically examine their own procedure and admit wrongdoing.

The Minister of Justice already has extensive documents and a chronology of the entire case, procedural objections and specific court decisions. No one can ask him to interfere with the independent decision-making of the courts. That doesn't belong to him. However, it can examine the quality of procedural procedures, the level of justification of court decisions and recurring systemic deficiencies within the scope of the state administration of courts. If this does not happen even now, it will no longer be a question of whether the Czech judiciary faces individual procedural failures. The real question will be whether it can maintain the trust of citizens on its own. And if not, who will protect her from losing that trust.

Source:

European Court of Human Rights.Cross v. Poland, No. 28249/95, judgment of 19 June 2001. Available from: HUDOC – European Court of Human Rights.

European Court of Human Rights.Běleš and Others v. the Czech Republic, No. 47273/99, judgment of 12 November 2002. Available from: HUDOC – European Court of Human Rights.

European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber).Zubac v. Croatia, No. 40160/12, judgment of 5 April 2018. Available from: HUDOC – European Court of Human Rights.

Czech Republic. Act No. 99/1963 Coll., Code of Civil Procedure, in particular § 14, § 15a, § 15b, § 75a, § 102 and § 235a, as amended.

Czech Republic. Resolution of the Regional Court in Prague dated 22 October 2025, No. 100 Co 266/2025-12.