Advocacy without accountability: a monopoly that fails

Advocacy has long been building an image of an exclusive, almost sacred space - a space where the law is not only applied, but almost "owned". The Czech Bar Association acts as a guarantor of legality, professional ethics and client protection. It effectively claims a monopoly not only on the provision of legal services, but also on the definition of what "correct law" is. But the reality of recent years has systematically dismantled this image - and cases such as the embezzlement of 161 million crowns are breaking it definitively.

The case of attorney Hana Suková is not just an individual failure of an individual. It's a system test. And the advocacy—for all its institutional self-assurance—didn't hold up. According to media findings, the professional chamber had information about suspected manipulations of client funds several years before the scandal broke out. Yet the controls failed, in a way that the police themselves described as "lax" and effectively inadequate.

Yes, law enforcement has concluded that this is not a criminal act by the Chamber. But here a fundamental question opens up: is the absence of criminal responsibility really the same as the absence of responsibility as such? It isn't. And it is precisely in this difference that the structural problem of the self-government of lawyers is revealed.

The Bar Association claims control over entry into the profession, disciplinary authority and supervision over the practice of law. Thus, it functions as a regulator, a professional court and an ethical authority at the same time. This concentration of powers is defended by the argument of expertise and autonomy. But this very autonomy turns in practice into a closed system with limited external control - a system that is able to protect its own integrity, but not necessarily the client's.

And here we come to an even more serious aspect that fundamentally changes the perspective of the whole problem: there are proceedings in which the state directly imposes the obligation to be represented by a lawyer. So it's not a client's choice, but a legal imperative. A typical example is the procedure for a cassation complaint before the Supreme Administrative Court according to § 105 paragraph 2 of the Administrative Code of Court, where representation by a lawyer is mandatory. Similarly, in appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court according to § 241 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In these cases, the individual is effectively deprived of the opportunity to act for himself - access to court is conditional on the entry of a lawyer.

This fundamentally changes the balance of rights and responsibilities. If the state compels an individual to enter into a legal relationship with a lawyer, it implicitly assumes responsibility for the quality and safety of that relationship. The bar association then becomes not just a professional organization, but a key element in the administration of justice. And that makes its failure all the more serious.

In the embezzlement case of 161 million crowns, it is not a case of marginal misconduct. Dozens of clients have lost the funds they entrusted to the lawyer, trusting that the lawyer's escrow institute was safe. At the same time, this trust is the basic pillar of the entire advocacy. If it turns out that the control mechanisms are only formal - as the police officers, after all, stated that the control was "formally correct" but insufficient - then it is not an individual failure, but an institutional failure.

Even more serious is the paradox that follows from this: the legal profession claims exclusivity in the provision of legal services precisely with reference to the protection of the client. In other words, the state delegates part of its regulatory function to professional self-government because it believes that lawyers themselves are best able to ensure quality and ethics. But when this model fails, a fundamental deficit of legitimacy arises – especially where the lawyer is the obligatory mediator between the individual and the court.

Another level of the problem cannot be overlooked either. In the legal profession – as in any other profession – there are individuals who engage in criminal activity or exhibit fundamental professional deficits. This in itself is not surprising. However, the question of how the system reacts to risk signals is fundamental. In this case, there were clues, repeated cash withdrawals and suspicious transactions, and yet there was no effective intervention. This means that the control mechanisms were not able to identify even obvious anomalies.

This fact directly challenges the argument that the bar association is a sufficient guarantor of client protection. If an institution with a supervisory monopoly fails to prevent a massive failure, then its monopoly position ceases to be defensible to its original extent—especially in a situation where that monopoly is enforced by law.

From a legal-theoretical point of view, two principles collide here: the autonomy of professional self-government and the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. The right to legal aid and a fair trial is not an abstract construct – it is a concrete right of the client, who in some cases is forced to use the services of a lawyer and thus enter a system that he cannot bypass. If this system fails to provide effective protection, the legitimate expectation of the client, which is also protected by the constitutional order, is violated.

Advocacy thus faces an unpleasant mirror. On the one hand, it declares high ethical standards, disciplinary responsibility and professional honor. On the other hand, reality shows that these declarations are not always accompanied by effective prevention and control tools. The result is asymmetry: the client bears the risk, while the system retains autonomy – even in situations where its participation is mandated by law.

To put it bluntly: the bar claims a patent on the law, but is not fully responsible for its enforcement – ​​even where the state compels an individual to use its services. It creates a normative framework, checks compliance with it, but fails at key moments to protect those for whom the framework is supposed to exist.

If the legal profession is to restore trust, declarations and ex post disciplinary proceedings are not enough. It is essential to open up the issue of real liability – including systemic liability for failure of control mechanisms, especially in areas where legal representation is mandatory. Otherwise, the same scenario will repeat itself: another case, another "formally correct" inspection, more clients without protection.

Source:

BLAZEK, V. (2026)161 million people disappeared from the lawyer. I have been paying off my debts, she claims in court.List News, 7 January 2026.

BLAZEK, V. (2025)Lawyer Suková is going to court, according to the indictment, she embezzled 161 million.List of Reports, 1 October 2025.

ČTK / iROZHLAS (2026)Former lawyer Suková confessed to the embezzlement of tens of millions.iROZHLAS, January 7, 2026.

KERLES, M. (2025)A billion from attorney's escrows is bullshit. And no one is to blame? INFO.cz, 11 October 2025.

ČTK / Czech Justice (2025)The police proposed to indict lawyer Sukova and her daughter for embezzlement of 161 million crowns.Czech Justice, March 3, 2025